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Sugarcane Stalinism: State-Capitalism and Development in Cuba
Abstract
Though their conclusions are radically different, defenders of both “socialist” and “neither socialist, nor
capitalist” theories about Cuba and other statified societies nevertheless coincide in the view that the
nationalization of private enterprises constitutes a partial, or perhaps even wholesale, negation of
capitalism and its laws of motion. Throughout this essay, I will attempt a critical analysis of the
aforementioned theories employing an approach that is methodologically Marxist and forthright in its
commitment to workers’ self-emancipation. I will argue, moreover, that “socialist” Cuba is really a society
based on wage labor and capital accumulation. The defining characteristics of this society, to which we
will assign the designation ‘state-capitalism’, are the hyper-concentration of capital and collective exercise
of de facto control over the means of production by a state bourgeoisie.
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“Nations, as well as individuals, cannot escape the imperatives of capital accumulation without
abolishing capital.” – Grandizo Munis, “For a Second Communist Manifesto”1

The official narrative concerning the nature of the changes to the economy and broader
society ushered in by the Cuban government after the so-called “revolution” of 1959 holds that the
agrarian reform and subsequent statification of the economy—i.e., the transferal of ownership of
the means of production from private capitalists to the state—have set Cuba on the path to
socialism. This was the viewpoint advanced by the French agronomist Rene Dumont, who served
as an advisor to the freshly-minted “socialist” government on matters pertaining to economic
development. Since that time, other scholars on the Left have undertaken a serious study of the
Cuban economic formation. Among those who have done so through a critical lens, Samuel Farber
stands out as the most intellectually rigorous and consistent. His excellent book about Cuba after
the triumph of the barbudos over the CIA-sponsored Batista dictatorship provides a rare window
into the inner workings of the Stalinist system in its Cuban instantiation. Farber subscribes to the
standard “bureaucratic collectivist” position, maintaining that while Cuba falls short of the
benchmark for socialism due to the absence of meaningful control over production and distribution
by the laboring masses, neither can it be considered capitalist, since the existing proprietary
arrangements supposedly prevent economic competition. Instead, he says, what exists in Cuba is
a qualitatively new kind of class society based on the autocratic rule of a parasitic bureaucracy
encrusted in the state apparatus, whose iron-tight grip over both the economy and society at large
frustrates any attempt by individual enterprises to pursue their particular economic interests.2
Though their conclusions are radically different, defenders of both “socialist” and “neither
socialist, nor capitalist” (henceforth, neither-nor) theories about Cuba and other statified societies
nevertheless coincide in the view that the nationalization of private enterprises constitutes a partial,
or perhaps even wholesale, negation of capitalism and its laws of motion. This conception, whose
unfortunate genealogy can be traced back to the “state-socialist” ideas of Ferdinand Lassalle and
his followers in the First International, has no basis whatsoever in the theory of socialism
elaborated by Marx and Engels. For the latter, state monopolies did not represent the negation of
capitalist production relations but rather a greater concentration of capital.3 In fact, they held that
the transition towards socialism would necessarily entail a progressive weakening, or “withering
away”, of the state machinery. Throughout this essay, I will attempt a critical analysis of the
aforementioned theories employing an approach that is methodologically Marxist and forthright
in its commitment to workers’ self-emancipation. I will argue, moreover, that “socialist” Cuba is
really a society based on wage labor and capital accumulation. The defining characteristics of this
society, to which we will assign the designation ‘state-capitalism’, are the hyper-concentration of
capital and collective exercise of de facto control over the means of production by a state
bourgeoisie.
As with so many of the New Left’s leading lights, it is not entirely clear what Dumont
understood “socialism” to mean. If the Monthly Review crowd with which he associated is any
indication, then we are safe in assuming that the state figures prominently in his conception.
However, since he failed to leave behind so much as a brief outline or operational definition, we
are left to decipher his views from a handful of scattered remarks in his account of the Cuban
economy’s transformation along Soviet lines. For instance, he contrasts “socialist planning” with

“the invisible hand of profit”, which allocates capital according to wherever the rate of profit is
highest. By contrast, he says, a socialist economy will substitute the central planner’s will for the
anarchic “law of the market place”, though he does not specify anywhere what the operation of
such a law entails or how it is manifested concretely in social production.4 Instead, Dumont regales
his readers with anecdote after boring anecdote of him reproaching enterprise managers and state
book-keepers for making plans in a completely ad hoc fashion and setting output targets based on
erroneous, or even fabricated, figures. All this, he explains to us, prevents a planned economy from
functioning smoothly.5 Regrettably, his inquiry into the failure of planning in Cuba both began
and ended there. Farber demonstrates a far superior grasp of the problem than Dumont, identifying
the inefficiency, mechanical breakdowns, and waste in the system as a logical consequence of the
hierarchical organization of production. He correctly argues that the lack of genuine feedback,
indispensable to economic planning under any system, and mediocre productivity in spite of
chronic overstaffing result from inadequate to nonexistent material incentives and the transparent
separation of the producers from the instruments of labor.6
This explanation may appear counterintuitive upon first glance. After all, workers in the
conventional capitalist countries are also dispossessed of any means of production. However,
enterprise managers under the two systems have a different set of tools at their disposal to
discipline their workers. Most notably, whereas workers in the conventional capitalist countries
can be compelled on pain of joblessness to maintain a certain level of productivity, their
counterparts in Cuba are generally protected from long-term unemployment by a provision in the
country’s constitution establishing employment as a fundamental right of citizenship.7 As a result,
enterprise managers are often forced to tolerate a certain degree of idleness, and even absenteeism,
from their workers as a transactional cost for meeting the production quotas imposed on them by
those higher up on the bureaucratic chain of command. Hence, to the extent that economic planning
exists at all in Cuba, it has always functioned badly and in an inconsistent manner. In reality,
revisions to the final output quotas occur so frequently and are so widespread across the various
industries and enterprises that there effectively is no such thing as “the plan”. Guaranteed
employment is also cited by those who defend a “socialist” or neither-nor perspective as airtight
proof of the nonexistence of a labor market in Cuba. Indeed, some have even argued that since
workers in these countries supposedly do not enjoy the double-freedom of which Marx spoke—
i.e., the “freedom” to sell their labor-power to an employer and “freedom” from any means of
production—there is not even a working class proper. Such an interpretation cannot be reconciled
with the facts. Firstly, a worker in Cuba can have his or her employment terminated after repeated
minor offenses, or as punishment for engaging in dissident activity.8 Although this is highly
undesirable, since an infraction of that magnitude shows up on the work record, restricting future
job possibilities.9 It is known, moreover, that the rate of annual labor turnover in state-capitalist
countries such as Cuba is comparatively higher than that of the conventional capitalist countries.10
This suggests that labor-power can be bought and sold in Cuba.
Conventional wisdom on the Left dictates that state planning interferes with the
unconscious forces of the market that govern production under capitalism. The intellectual
primogenitor of this idea is the Stalino-Keynesian Paul Sweezy. Though not original, Sweezy was
undoubtedly one of the first to systematize this sacrilege against Marxism and present it before an
audience of self-styled radicals and intellectuals in the English-speaking world. His theory
provides much of the conceptual framework that holds “socialist” and neither-nor interpretations

together, so we shall have to examine its foundational assumptions. According to Sweezy, all that
is needed to do away with the “law of value”—i.e., the social mechanism that regulates the
exchange of commodities under capitalism according to the average amount of time necessary to
produce them—is that economic planning take root and replace market forces as the principal
means of mobilizing the factors of production.11 This flies in the face of historical experience,
which demonstrates, conclusively, that the law of value can coexist alongside state planning, for
example, in the form of import-substitution industrialization, investment incentives and subsidies
to native firms, management of public utilities, nationalization of key industries, directive planning
(see: French dirigisme), and control over the flow of money-capital through centralized banking.
Third-world “developmentalist” states have employed many of these strategies to gain an
advantage against their rivals on the world market by nurturing native industries until they can
compete.12 The purpose of state planning is the same everywhere: it is about introducing a degree
of regularity and uniformity into the economy, where it otherwise does not exist, to facilitate the
fulfillment of certain objectives and mitigate cyclical crises. For instance, the need to restore
anemic profit rates in the conventional capitalist countries gave rise to an institutional arrangement
known as the “mixed economy” whereby the state, employing a combination of economic ‘sticks’
and ‘carrots’, fiscal stimuli, and even direct economic intervention, steers capital investment and
production towards desired ends. In the United States, the country of laissez-faire capitalism par
excellence, government spending as a percentage of GDP since 1970 has reached a high of 43%,
while that figure has never fallen below 34% within that same period, indicating that at any given
time the state controls between a third to two-fifths of the economy.13 Even though the US
government does not tell businesses how much of what to produce, it is effectively engaged in a
form of planning, in which certain forms of production receive preference over others, by
redistributing money from the more profitable sectors of the economy to those that need it by
means of taxation and deficit financing (i.e., deferred taxation). Thus, we see that instead of
mangling markets state-planning has become indispensable for their preservation.
As a social entity, capital leads a twofold existence: a phenomenal existence as an array of
independent economic units and an essential existence as total social capital, or the sum of capitals
in their dynamic interrelations. Total social capital manifests itself exclusively through its
individual fragments. However, these fragments are only independent from each other and total
social capital in a relative sense, since their existence implies both. Let us imagine that capital is
an electronic circuit, while the individual fragments are the nodes. The nodes are an integral part
of the circuit: there is no circuit without them and vice-versa. Each node is a part of, and hence
dependent on, the whole circuit. Now, the individual nodes can be spaced closer or further apart—
or, in the case of capital, it can be more or less concentrated—but they cannot exist outside the
circuit, outside the totality. Applying the same concept to wage labor yields important insights.
Workers in a capitalist society are “free” with respect to the individual capitalists to whom they
sell their labor-power, while they are attached to total social capital as accessories. Indeed, the very
presence of wage labor implies competition between enterprises because it presupposes economic
units with enough autonomy to make independent decisions with regards to employment.14 The
conferral of the means of production onto a single entity—what I referred to earlier as ‘hyperconcentration’ of capital—has not extinguished competition within Cuba. It has merely changed
the juridical-legal form of private property from individual (private) property to state property.
The means of production are the class property of the state bourgeoisie and the non-property of
workers. To explain this in terms of our electronic circuit metaphor: the nationalization of

enterprises in Cuba has brought the individual nodes in the circuit—i.e., the fragments of total
social capital—closer together, while the circuit as such remains intact. The detractors of statecapitalism theory and some proponents, such as the Cliffites, treat Cuba and other countries in that
mold as a single economic unit.15 The “giant factory” thesis is seductive in large part because it
makes an analysis of these societies more manageable by condensing many complex phenomena
into a single object of study. This assumes a functional monolithism in which the constitutive
elements of the social totality behave as parts of a harmonious, undifferentiated whole. A more
exhaustive examination on our part will show that this assumption is completely unjustified.
Competition exists so long as total social production is functionally fragmented into a
plurality of reciprocally autonomous and competing enterprises. Two criteria are necessary to
demonstrate the relative organizational separation of enterprises, and it can only ever be relative.
The first is the presence of a market for labor-power. The second is the exchange of products
between enterprises in money-commodity form.16 It was established earlier that enterprises in
Cuba are independent employers of labor. But they are also in competition with each another in
the Marxian sense—i.e., they confront one another as buyers and sellers of commodities. We know
that this is so because their products are exchanged for money instead of being directly
appropriated and physically distributed. A report on the state of Cuba’s economy during the
Special Period, before the market reforms of the late 90s, conducted by the ECLAC, a regional
subdivision of the UN, found that, “[c]ompanies in the traditional sector sell at regulated prices,
frequently receive preferential tax and tariff treatment, and acquire a large part of their inputs
with subsidies, in order to cover the deficits that arise from selling at subsidized prices.” The report
continues: “[t]he producer of tradable goods operates in international or domestic markets and
has no obligation to purchase inputs in the domestic market.”17 In other words, Cuban enterprises
produce goods that they then sell on domestic and foreign markets; they purchase inputs of raw
material, as well as intermediate, or semi-finished, goods from each other and from foreign
companies; and finally, their transactions, whether scriptural or cash, are exchange transactions in
which money functions as both a measure of value and medium of circulation. It may be argued
that these transactions are only formalities because the state is the owner of all the means of
production. The same thesis may also be restated thusly: even though the process which we have
just described has the form of commodity exchange, its actual content is different, because
enterprises within Cuba are subject, under the legal framework of statified property, to strict
limitations on their operation. Yet this begs the question of why the products of human labor would
have to be exchanged for money in the first place, or appear to be exchanged. The answer, of
course, is that the state depends on the profitability of the economy as a whole, therefore it
obligates enterprises to be responsible for their own financial affairs, which turns them into
independent units with competing economic interests. Adherents of “socialist” and neither-nor
theories also deny that competition exists within Cuba because the state allows unprofitable
enterprises to continue operating. Though it is commonplace for states to prop up native firms—
even whole industries—by absorbing their losses, nothing about this arrangement is incompatible
with the existence of competition and commodity exchange. The idealized version of capitalism
as a purely free market with only minimal government interference, which these people use as a
standard for comparison, exists nowhere but in textbooks. It also runs counter to the experience of
capitalism over the last century and a half, which is replete with examples of the state tampering
with the “normal” operation of markets. In fact, what is most unusual about the variety of
capitalism which has been established in Cuba is that losses and profits all ultimately revert to the

state, where the balance is then redistributed among the different branches. In the process, many
non-viable sectors and firms are artificially kept afloat. However, central planners can only tolerate
insolvency to a limited degree. They do not have free reign to reapportion money as they so choose,
at least not forever, since this would reduce the total amount of money available for capital
formation and undermine Cuba’s competitiveness on the world market. The same is true of
commodity prices in Cuba, as these must mirror global commodity prices or else lose the Cuban
state money if they stray too far or for too long. In short, the very same mechanisms that mobilize
labor and capital inputs according to the requirements of valorization in the conventional capitalist
countries also make their appearance under state-capitalism, albeit in a highly distorted form.
Instead of eliminating these mechanisms altogether, competition forces the state to introduce its
own in order to attempt to do consciously (and less efficiently) what the market does
unconsciously.18
The accumulation of capital, or enlarged reproduction of the physical means of production,
is the sole objective of production within a capitalist economy. This is because, as Marx explained,
“the development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the
amount of the capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking. . .it compels [the capitalist] to keep
constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it, but extend it he cannot, except by means
of progressive accumulation.”19 In Capital, Marx laid out the formula of capitalist reproduction
as follows: c + v + s, where c represents constant capital or the physical capital stock, v is variable
capital or wages, and s is surplus-value or profit. The mass of surplus-value can itself be divided
up into two parts, one which is designated for capitalist consumption and another which is
earmarked for accumulation. Let us refer to these as k (capitalist consumption fund) and a
(accumulation fund) respectively, such that the mass of surplus-value S = k + a. Under capitalism,
the growth of c depends directly on the amount of a, with v not increasing except inasmuch as it
is necessary to employ additional labor-power in order to set an enlarged mass of capital, c, in
motion. By contrast, in a socialist society, the growth of c would depend entirely on the needs of
v, the physical reproduction requirements of the population, while S and its components k and a
would be available to whomever needed them in the form of additional products ready for
consumption.20 In Cuba, as in all the other state-capitalist countries, any increase in the labor fund
that sustains the whole working class, v, is directly contingent upon the expansion of c, the mass
of the means of production, and the accumulation fund, a, which feeds its growth. Instead of
suppressing the accumulation of capital and the extraction of surplus-value on which it is
predicated, the nationalization of industries accelerates what are already innate tendencies of the
capital accumulation process: 1) the concentration of capital, what Marx called “expropriation of
many capitalists by few”; and 2) the “socialization” of production, or the tendency for the various
branches of industry to become dependent upon one another.21 Both serve to increase the social
productivity of labor, and hence the rate at which surplus-value is pumped out of the working class,
by raising the organic composition of capital (ratio of c to v). The nationalization of industries
achieves this by creating enterprises that are more compact and better-suited to take advantage of
the economies of scale, which reduce the per-unit cost of production as industrial output expands.
On the other hand, the socialization of production harmonizes the different branches of industry,
preventing “bottlenecks”, or imbalances in output along each phase of the production sequence. In
summation, the goal of production in Cuba is still the accumulation of capital out of profits—i.e.,
the unpaid labor of the working class. The legal monopoly exercised by the Cuban state over the

instruments of work has not changed the basic manner in which production is socially organized
because, “right can never be higher than the economic structure of society.”22
The leaders of the new government were optimistic, at least early on, that Cuba would be
able to break free of its reliance on sugar and diversify its economy. They turned Marx on his head
arguing that it was necessary, for the construction of socialism, to develop Cuba’s economic
base—i.e., to accumulate capital at an accelerated rate by subjecting workers to an intensified
exploitation. The US economic blockade against Cuba created a shortage of basic consumer goods
and spare parts for existing machinery, most of which came from America. Since there was no
alternative source of spare parts, the new government turned to the other great imperialist power,
the Soviet Union, for economic assistance, which it readily provided. The Soviets sent machines
to Cuba but industrialization soon ran up against some problems of a technical nature: the
‘intermediate technology’ produced in the USSR and its buffer states was very clunky and
inefficient, as well as incompatible with much of the existing equipment. Cuba would eventually
have to import newer machines from Western Europe or Japan. However, these could only be
bought with dollars, and the quickest and most reliable way to obtain dollars was to export sugar.
Moreover, despite receiving significant aid from the Soviets, Cuba still needed to pay for the
massive import bill it had racked up. This, too, it could do only by selling sugar.23 The same process
that had led the Cuban state to “double-down”, so to speak, on sugar production as its primary
source of revenue in previous years culminated towards the end of the sixties with the campaign
to harvest ten million tons of sugar. Now the Soviets provided Cuba with a guaranteed market for
all its of its sugar production, just as the United States had done up until 1960, the year that the
economic blockade went into effect, under the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902.24 Because
Cuba is a single-export economy, it has always depended on an imperialist sponsor with a much
larger economy to absorb its output. The US had filled that role prior to 1960 and now the Soviet
Union would do so. In both instances, the political price paid by Cuba was onerous. The US had
demanded a naval base on sovereign Cuban territory and the right to intervene militarily to defend
its business interests, while the Soviets demanded that Cuba serve as its proxy in armed conflicts
all over the world. In 1966, Cuba negotiated a lucrative trade agreement with the Soviet Union to
sell five million tons of sugar at above-market prices in the years 1968-69 but total output fell short
of the mark, averaging just 3.7 million tons in each year. Undeterred by this failure, and determined
as ever to transform Cuba into an industrial powerhouse, the new rulers set their sights on an even
more ambitious goal, conceived as a cure-all for the country’s economic woes: Cuba would defy
the laws of nature and economics by tripling its output within the space of a single year, with a
ten-million-ton sugar harvest. The Soviets would buy the agreed-upon 5 million tons at the price
point stipulated by their trade agreement with Cuba, and another 2 million would be sold on the
world market at the average going rate, while the remaining 3 million would be sold to consumers
and firms in domestic markets. The Cuban state, aided in great part by the Party and its trade union
appendages, launched a military-style campaign mobilizing the entire country to secure the
production target. Their efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful and the disorganization that the
campaign caused to the other sectors of the economy have had lasting effects from which, it can
be argued, Cuba still has not recovered. In the end, all plans of industrializing Cuba at breakneck
speed, just as Stalin had done in Russia during the first two five-year plans, were short-circuited
by the economic realities of the period after the ’59 coup d’état. Cuba had ceased to be a sugar
plantation for the United States only to become one for the Soviets.25

The agrarian reforms, which have been touted as a centerpiece of the “socialist” project in
Cuba, were a form of capitalist primitive accumulation, whose objective was to proletarianize the
peasantry, transforming it into a class of wage laborers. The parallels between this process and socalled “socialist primitive accumulation” in Stalin’s Russia, which was to lead to the travesty of
“socialist commodity production”, are remarkable. The state-owned farms created in Cuba by
merging the segmentary landholdings of poor and middling peasants, or by breaking up the large
estates, function as commercial farms. Those who labor in these glorified capitalist enterprises,
cynically baptized “people’s farms” (granjas del pueblo), receive their “wage” as a small fraction
of the total crop yield, v, that is barely adequate to keep them alive, while the state sells the excess
product, s, in domestic markets for a profit.26 The top-down management structure of these
enterprises, rooted in statified property, and the resulting lack of control over the distribution of
the output is acknowledged by the Cuban state to be a major disincentive to productivity, yet this
could not be otherwise.27 Any measure of authentic control over the economy exercised by the
producers themselves threatens, not only the rate of capital accumulation, but the functional
integrity of the Cuban political system, which is based on an all-pervading militarism, and
therefore cannot be tolerated. Private farmers are incorporated into the nexus of value-production
as small-holders with usufructory, rather than ownership, rights to the land. In practice, however,
they do not freely dispose of the product of their labor, but must sell it to the state through its
distribution centers (Centros de Acopio) at fixed prices, engaging in what amounts to piece-work.28
Unusual though it may seem, their predicament typifies that of the Cuban worker: subjected to a
ruthless exploitation, which knows no limits, not even those of human physiology; completely
immobilized and deprived of all autonomy by an omnipresent state machinery; supervised at all
times by the police, the CDRs (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución), and in the workplace by the
unions, who also play an organizing function within Cuban capitalism; without the right to
organize or express themselves; at the mercy of the whims of the state bourgeoisie; etc. In no other
country is the working class as dominated as in Cuba, something that the Cuban government
unambiguously promotes as a major selling point to its prospective partners in joint ventures. A
study by the Brookings Institution, a capitalist think-tank, remarked that although, “[t]he
Confederation of Cuban Workers and Communist Party cells are embedded within firms. . . these
organizations generally align with the production goals of the firm and its associated state
agencies”, and therefore, “[m]anagement need not worry about militant strikes or work
stoppages.”29 The profoundly reactionary nature of the unions derives from the role that they play
within capitalism as regulators of the purchase and sale of labor-power. They are interested in
maintaining the system of wage labor because their existence depends on it. This has allowed them
to become integrated into the capitalist state as its auxiliary organs, a process that reaches its
highest expression in state-capitalist countries such as Cuba.30 But unlike in other capitalist
countries, the unions in Cuba do not even pretend to represent the workers, or to negotiate with
employers on their behalf. They are state organs tasked with imposing labor discipline and
maximizing workers’ productivity. 31
All the measures undertaken by the Cuban government since ‘59, and approvingly cited by
the state bourgeoisie and its partisans, both internal and external, as concrete evidence of its
“revolutionary” and “working-class” character, were completely self-serving and implemented in
order to shore up capitalism on the island. Perhaps the best example, though, and the one that best
illustrates this point, is the Cuban state’s successful campaign to eradicate illiteracy in the
countryside. This is one of the enduring legacies of Cuban state-capitalism and something to which

the government has resorted time after time to justify its own existence from a moral standpoint.
Cuba, they say, was a backward country with an underdeveloped economy, trapped in a parasitic
relationship with its neighbor to the north, the revolution has given it its independence and made
it the envy of all Latin America! What these people do not see, or do not want to see, is that all the
achievements of the supposed “revolution” were categorically capitalist measures. Their purpose
was never to improve the living conditions of the Cuban worker, but to enlarge the Cuban national
capital, achieving a greater rate of exploitation (ratio of s to v) through better utilization of the
existing technology. After relations between the US and Cuba took a turn for the worse, and Cuba
aligned itself with the Soviet Union, the country experienced a hemorrhaging of the very skilled
workers that it would need to industrialize the economy. Shipments of machinery and raw
materials from the Soviet Union, which were quite generous, were literally piling up on the docks,
since Cuba had neither the personnel to operate them nor buildings in which to store them. 32 In
order to industrialize and keep abreast of competitors, Cuba would have to convert its illiterate
rural population into a workforce capable of generating surplus-value for the state. Although the
attempt to industrialize Cuba stumbled against insurmountable barriers, a highly-skilled workforce
was left over as a byproduct of this aborted process. In recent years, human capital exports have
replaced sugar production, which collapsed after the fall of the Soviet Union due to the loss of a
guaranteed market, as the country’s primary source of income, with tourism and remittances from
abroad as second and third respectively. Brazil, for example, pays the Cuban state $4,000 per
month for each doctor sent over on “internationalist mission”. However, these doctors only earn
an average of $400 each month in wages.33 The difference is appropriated by the government as
surplus-value to pay for military spending and the luxury consumption of the ruling class, or is
otherwise reinvested in profitable business ventures, many of them with foreign capitalists. Even
Cuba’s “socialist” health care system, held up by many as its crowning achievement, serves the
accumulation needs of the national capital. From the point of view of capital, a state-run health
care system is preferable to a private or multi-payer system, such as exists in the US, because it
allows the whole capitalist class to pool money for the cost of reproducing the workforce, which
also includes health care, instead of having to bear that cost individually. Furthermore, since it
allows workers to see a doctor more frequently, and in addition gives them access to preventive
care, it also reduces said costs in the long-term, not to mention the work hours squandered due to
illness.34 In short, it is about molding the worker according to the requirements of enlarged
reproduction and minimizing the cost of his needs to yield more surplus-value.
The capitalist economy, whether it be private or state, demands endless economic growth,
which, however, can only be obtained through an increase in the rate of exploitation and/or a
reduction in working-class consumption. The state bourgeoisie in Cuba has tried both strategies,
with disastrous results for workers, who have seen their living standards absolutely decimated over
the past six decades. Both right-wing dissidents and leftist activists, inside and outside the island,
have put forward their solutions, some more worthy of discussion than others, but all of them suffer
from the same defect: they do not question whatsoever the material bases of capitalist society. The
general consensus on the Right is that the command apparatus should be dismantled in favor of a
free-market system and state property auctioned off to companies or private individuals. However,
there is much less agreement about how quickly to proceed with de-nationalization (the
experiences of Russia and the countries in the former the Soviet Bloc, one assumes, have served
as cautionary stories against the dangers of “reckless privatization”) and which social programs
will ultimately be spared the chopping block. Proposals on the Left are much more varied, ranging

from Yugoslav-style “self-management”, in which worker-operated enterprises compete within a
fairly deregulated market economy, to a “democratized” state-capitalism.35 In fact, one of the most
oft-made criticisms of Castro-Stalinism on the Left is that it unjustly excludes from decisionmaking all but a handful of persons. In other words, that it is authoritarian and undemocratic. Yet
this simply mistakes symptoms for the disease. The rigidly hierarchical character of the Cuban
economy is a byproduct of statified property. Its transformation into individual private property,
or decentralization through legalistic means, would not alter its content in the slightest. All that
would change is the particular institutional form of capitalism. In reality, all of the proposed
solutions amount to little more than superficial modifications to the current system, while its
essential pillars, wage labor and capital accumulation, remain firmly in place. It is revealing that
all, or almost all, of the factors cited as reasons for pursuing such changes—for example, receiving
better feedback, eliminating waste, increasing labor productivity, improving enterprise efficiency,
etc.—derive from the structural imperative to enlarge the national capital. At bottom, the LeftRight duality in politics represents nothing more than different alternatives for managing
capitalism. The working class must reject this paradigm in its entirety, putting the immediate
abolition of wage labor and commodity exchange on the agenda, first on a national, then an
international, scale. For this to happen it would be necessary, in Cuba and other countries, for the
exploited to rise up against the state, doing away with this machinery of repression once and for
all, and establish their own power structure based on the workers' councils: committees of
democratically-elected and instantly revocable delegates. These organs will be responsible for
expropriating capital, administering the economy, and overseeing the extension of the socialized,
or strictly use-value producing, sector of the economy. These are the tasks ahead and in Cuba, as
everywhere, it is only the working class who can carry them to completion. The suppression of the
capitalist system, whatever its form, is the essential condition for the liberation of humankind from
all oppression and its reconstitution as a true community.
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